Abstract. Human genetic resources are important biological resources of genetic and environmental factors to analyze the genetic structure, institutional conditions, disease incidence and medical research of specific groups in the region, which have high scientific research and application value. Currently, as to the application of resources, China's human genetic resources platform uses a high degree of a public welfare sharing mechanism, and to their own intellectual property protection investment is inadequate, resulting in poor resource value recovery, and poor value of resource collection and management processes. This not only has a negative impact on the sustainable operation of China's human genetic resources platform, but has also affected the effective use of human genetic resources. This paper puts forward the research on the sharing mechanism of human genetic resources, with focus on the analysis of resource-sharing cooperation mode, the market-oriented mode of resource development, and the construction of the economic model of resource application. According to this, the paper gives rational application suggestions, and provides a more viable fundamental plan to achieve full value of human genetic resources.
Core issues and performance
The standardization of China's sharing of human genetic resources is promoted gradually, but there are still many problems in the realization of resource value and security, one of the most prominent problems is the interests' protection of the export of resources.
The lack of property rights protection in the international sharing of human genetic resources has led to the loss of our interests. From the basic value view of human genetic resources, the direct application value of resources is the value of scientific research, and the result of scientific research work will produce high market value. However, there is a general lack of protection of intellectual property rights in the international sharing of human genetic resources in China. At the same time, there are still some problems such as the lack of clarity on the responsibility of parties, the inaccurate record of import and export information, and the effective implementation of resource and sample scope constraints [1] , which leads to a loss of interest. Other scientific research enterprises and institutions in developed countries have applied for patents and have sold back to China after using the human genetic resources exported by China and have obtained the corresponding results. This leads to a second loss of our interests. In this regard, in 2015, the State Council changed the name of "design of human genetic resources, international cooperation project approval" to "human genetic resources gathering, collection, sale, export, exit approval" on the original "Interim Measures for the management of human genetic resources", and drew up corresponding guidelines for further specification regarding the gathering, collection, and export exit approval of human genetic resources.
Before the launch of the new service guide, the annual approval rate of China's human genetic resources use was more than 70%, however, in the first year after the release of the guidelines (October -December 2015), the approval rate dropped to 61% [2] , and the second year (Full year 2016) to 57% [3] . This shows the management contents, responsibility, and standards that were involved in the human genetic resources sharing export under the new norms have gradually improved. However, from the view of problem solving, the value transformation in the process of resource sharing still cannot be solved, only the standardization of the shared behavior is guaranteed under the framework of the legal system.
A cause analysis of the human genetic resources sample sharing in China and the directional thinking of countermeasures
In view of the above analysis, the problem of value transformation in China's human genetic resources sharing is obvious and cannot effectively be solved. It can also be transformed from a problem at this stage and thought about as "how to make use of the human genetic resource value more effectively?". Combined with this problem, this paper examines the obstacles of economic value of human genetic resources sharing, and considers a specific strategic solution strategy according to the corresponding obstacles.
Firstly, from the perspective of resource characteristics, human genetic resources are non-renewable resources. The re-use of resource samples is almost impossible. Once the inappropriate resources are used, it cannot be fully restored. Additionally, the process of collecting resources, gathering costs, collection costs, storage costs, platform information and resources management costs etc. cannot be fully recovered too [4] . At the same time, the ethical norms involved in the application of human genetic resources have a large limit on the scope of application of resources, so the conditions of market operation are also very restrictive. In this way, the contradiction between the high cost of resource construction and the high risk of output is difficult to completely eliminate, which requires mining the risk sharing problem from the cost point of view. In this regard, a consideration on a more reasonable collection of cost risk transfer strategy is necessary.
Secondly, from the perspective of the international sharing of human genetic resources in China, the value of resources is to actually exist in the process of contribution, but the basic value of resources does not return to the resources itself (or resource contractors, all parties, etc). This contributes to the rise of investment of resources and the value of output imbalance problems. From a fundamental point of view, this is the limitation for current resources of the sample management model itself. China's human genetic resources are mainly stored in major state-owned hospitals, and the construction of a resource library is almost entirely dependent on state funding. Although most of the projects are free applications [2] , due to the limitation of input-output ratio, the resource management side still has to bear a great risk on the unreasonable use of resources. Thus, many resource managers are reluctant to share resources. This actually reflects the parallel restraint mechanism, such as user qualification, resource use refinement management, and the penalization of resource unreasonable application, existing in human genetic resources sharing. So the solution to the specific problem should be to use scarce resource input and output balance constraints.
Finally, from the perspective of the transformation of human genetic resources value in China, the explicit problem is the imbalance of international community interests, but the most implicit problems are the isolation issues in the stage of resource generation and resource value generation (the product consumption stage after secondary knowledge value processing).
First of all, obviously, the intellectual property rights in the process of China's human genetic resources transfer are weak. This is apparently due to the backwardness of domestic R&D technology. In the process of resource sharing, developed countries have obtained genetic resources from developing countries through the international multilateral germplasm resource exchange mechanism (China Agricultural Science and Technology Institute has exported more than 28,000 genetic resources materials to international institutions over the past 20 years, many of which are the wild relatives and excellent local varieties) [5] . They use the low cost investment to obtain materials, and ultimately transfer into the goods value to elicit interests from developing countries.
At the same time, due to the different degree of technological progress, developed western countries have invested more in the exploitation of intellectual property value. Some developed countries and research institutions have gathered human genetic resources with low cost through the platform of genetic resources sharing, and thus have obtained technology and patents.
From the view of the outside problem, the value transformation of the resources is mainly concentrated in deep R&D. There is also a developer between the final value and the resource collection side. The cost of the developer input is low (since the dynamic space of the expected value is large), and developers will occupy the benefits of early resource collectors after they achieve the value of technological transformation. Basically, this problem is due to differences of resource disparity with technical differences, if limit the export of resources based on the outside problem, then the resources value in the non-compliance stage of domestic technology is difficult to transfer. So the focus should be shifted to control "Resource ownership", to eliminate the "middle" role between the resource collection and value of resources, and then achieve the direct link between resources and economic results.
Combined with the above analysis, this paper puts forward three suggestions on the optimization of the mechanism for human genetic resources sharing in China. Firstly, for the high cost of the collection, a model such as the PPP model should be proposed to absorb social funds, while addressing the cost pressures and the risk of return (risk diversification strategies in the financial sector). Secondly, targeting the imbalance between resource value and return, a proposal to use resource users restrain to ensure a reasonable return of resource value output. Thirdly, in view of the separation of the process of resource value transformation, we should use the idea of sharing economic thought to construct a basic framework of human resource sharing.
The Human Genetic Resources Collection Cost Pressure Dispersion Mechanism Based on Social Capital Gathering

Analysis of the prototype mechanism of PPP
The essence of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model is public sector financing, the most significant feature is the government agencies obtain the appropriate funds through cooperation with the private sector, and provide reasonable income channels to the private sector, but not provide the interests return guarantee [6] . In short, government departments provide social business organizations with the opportunity to invest in government-led projects, and commit to share a proportion of future return to investors, while a final income range is not reliable. This first meets the venture capital needs of social business needs, and it can significantly reduce the cost of capital pressure and technical cost pressures for the government departments, which also ensure the good realization of government functions.
This model has four points: First, the common decision-making. Government departments and commercial institutions have the same rights to make decisions of a project; Second, the joint investment, which are the basic conditions for the introduction of capital; Third, the risk of sharing, which is the necessary conditions to reduce the unilateral (government) risk pressure; Fourth, cost control, that is, provide a reasonable cost control strategy based on final income and risk control [7] .
In general, the government is still in the dominant position of the PPP model. The advantage is obvious; government holds a larger scale of external funds and risk-sharing effect by transferring the part of interests. If there are no constraints in the "government" role between government and enterprises, the PPP model can be applied to the construction of a human genetic resources platform (the project platform builder is usually then on-administrative agencies such as medical institutions, educational institutions etc., thus it cannot directly use the PPP model).
Social capital convergence mechanism based on PPP mode
The definition of the PPP model is relatively open in western countries, so the public sector is not limited to the executive branch. While the theoretical definition of the PPP model in China limits the ownership of the public sector (mainly belongs to government). This is because the government has the leading capacity and stronger ability in the government / government cooperation in the domestic environment. However, the PPP model itself is the obvious choice for non-commercial organization's financial channel expansion and risk diversification in public projects. It is a model that is worth learning from the construction of human genetic resources.
In this regard, this paper suggests that major medical and, research institutions in the construction of human genetic resources can be used in the following social cooperation model:
First, to ensure the basic control of capital construction, including resources collect, manage and share, and tap the resource value development based on basic relevant laws and regulations. But the cooperation project does not maximize the one-time interests as the fundamental goal, to eliminate excessive business problems under the premise of basic standards, while providing the basic conditions for cooperation;
Second, provide a basic value-sharing mechanism to partners, that is, in the long-term benefits with the paid sharing of future resources obtaining library and the intellectual property returns, the cooperative investors can receive a given size (provide quantitative returns, but not limit the return time),an established period (provide a fixed period of non-fixed return, but not limit the size of the return), or the continuous return conditions (provide a continuous, stated percentage of the return condition), thereby providing the investor's return condition and transferring the return risk portion to the investor.
Achieving the expansion of human resources source channels through social capital like PPP mode joins mechanism building, and does not have excessive and commercial restrictions on the value of achievement target, which effectively solves the cost problem.
The Value Recovery Mechanism of Human Genetic Resources Based on Return Restriction
The design notion of value recovery mechanism based on return constraint idea
From the perspective of human genetic resources sharing problem analysis in China, the imbalance between resource value recovery and cost input is an important problem in the sharing process. This is due to the fact that the existing sharing mechanism does not explicitly regulate the return of the resource value, resulting after the resource library builder invests a large number of inputs, the value obtained by resource users can not affect feedback to the resource builder because of the low-cost resource sharing conditions. For example, domestic pharmaceutical companies have gained technical results after obtaining shared resources for free or very low cost, and the resources value obtained when converted to the final product (part of the knowledge and technology cost in the product value) and cannot be returned to the resource library builder, thus leading to the imbalance between input and output.
For this problem, the best strategic solution is to restrain the process of returns, combined with the scarce characteristics of resources itself, this paper collects the return models of kinds of scarce resources, and found that (urban construction) land resources return mechanism are similar to the return model of human genetic resources. Although the (urban construction) land resources are reusable resources, its interval time of reuse is longer (usually more than 30 years). Since party B will fully grasp returns once they get the resources, while there is not any promise to party A [8] . For example, Beijing has developed "self-occupied housing" management regulations, in which the A level resource users (developers) must finish sales site publicity before sale, and the B level resource users (buyers) must follow the requirements of purchase conditions [9] .
This policy solves two aspects of the problem, one is the developer knows the return of resources use, and the resources owner can balance and restrain return conditions better, the second is to limit the use of resources, to ensure that resources can be more equitable covering more demand.
The value recovery mechanism of human genetic resources based on the theory of return restriction
Referencing the management ideas of Beijing's living business house, we can design some constraints to the use of value recycling of human genetic resources.
First, any resource consumer clears the use intention in the application. If it is used for research projects with commercial value, the expected return on business and the basic resource value return condition should be provided, for example, in accordance with the means of intellectual property rights to provide the necessary authorized return; Second, the amount of resources application should be limited to any resource users in the fixed cycle, so that it can ensure that the balance of practical rate among resource demand sides, and enhance the effective use of resource sharing. This can achieve the effective return of the resources value and avoid the unreasonable waste of resources in a greater degree through the above two constraint conditions.
The Value Generation Chain Compression Mechanism of Human Genetic Resources Based on Economic Idea
An analysis of the ideological connotation of sharing economy
The sharing economy is an emerging economic model, whose essence is to obtain the remuneration by transferring the usage right but retaining ownership. The usage rights of many types of resources can be transferred including, various types of idle goods, labor, education / medical resources and so on [10] . In essence, the core of the sharing economy is rational sharing based on trust relations. Compared to the previous sharing economy, it not only has the basic principles of ownership retention, but also stresses the "no use that is wasted" principle.
It has achieved two levels of relationship expansion during the formation of the sharing economy, one is to expand the exchange perspective to different areas, such as the link between non-operating organizations (e.g. human genetic resources library construction agencies) and business organizations, the second is to build the collaborative value sharing mechanism, including the sharing of resource value and output economic values.
Due to the resource sharing and collaborative consumption mechanism, the utilization of resources has been effectively improved and the waste rate of resources reduced, as well as shortening the distance between the resources and the final derivatives consumers. To a large extent it resists the likelihood of intermediate roles, which retains the stability of the resource builder's return. This is to compress the value generation chain, enhance the transparency of consumer demand, and reduce the risk of generating resources value.
Build mechanism of human genetic resources chain based on sharing economic idea
Combined with the four sharing types of the sharing economy, it can be mainly classified through the process of economic value generation. If the shared objects are direct consumer goods (such as idle goods), it belongs to sharing consumption; if it is the intellectual production process (such as design capacity), it should be sharing production; if it is knowledge resources (such as open source software, knowledge), it should be shared learning; if it is the capital channels (such as various types of Internet financial lender funds, etc.), it should be shared financials [11] .
It has the characteristics of sharing consumption and sharing learning from the perspective of human genetic resources characteristics. Among them, in order to improve the resource conversion rate, it is necessary to increase resource (effective) utilization rate as much as possible. It can achieve the form sharing through sharing consumption and ensure the return of resources value; In order to realize the deepening of resources value, it is necessary to provide its own resources so that the resource demanders (research institutions) can achieve the research objectives easily.
Combined with the reasonable return needs of the human genetic resources sharing mechanism value, it requires eliminating the intermediate side and determines the way of sharing resources through the predictable resource return assessment. As a result, the basic restriction model of the resource supply chain can be provided in resource sharing:
First, limit the qualification of resource applicants, if the resources are non-economic use, such as sharing, public, national development, etc., the applicant only needs to provide resources use intention and a research projects direction; if the resources are for commercial use, the applicant must have both R&D capabilities and business development capabilities, and provide the possible revenue after commercial development, while also providing a reasonable proportion of return to the resource provider; Second, the restriction of resource application must have the following basic conditions: regardless of the use of resources, resource-based research results should be located by the source builder, who acts as the benefit side of intellectual property rights.
In short, it can ensure that resource owners master the ownership of resources through this mode of cooperation, and there is no longer intermediate side while the application of resources may have commercial value. The resources owner can meet the consumer demand, and ultimately achieve the resources utilization and return rate.
Summary
In this research, the sharing mechanism of human genetic resource was analyzed. After analysis, previous problems that existed in this mechanism like, the standardization of resource use, have been gradually solved. However, most of the solutions were concentrated relatively on the surface and might lead to constant decline of resource utilization in the long-term. Basically, the application barrier was resulted from the lack of "transformation from resource to commercial value" and "commercial model". In addition, the special characteristics of human genetic resources also have influence on the process.
To solve the problems above, accordant solutions were proposed from the perspective of economic model construction. Three solutions were put forward in response to cost control, economic return, and information equivalence respectively: a social fundraising mechanism applying PPP method with the aim of eliminating the economic pressure of resource pool construction; a proposal of safeguarding the interests of the resource suppliers via return restriction; a proposal to shorten the resource supply chain based on economic ideas sharing. The proposals above were put forward in response to economic value outputting process, they were effective in relevant problems, but they are not the only solutions, while there might be alternatives. The practice, proper solutions could be used with regard to solving problems of cost control, economic return, and information unequivalence.
